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1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the World Trade Organization 1 engendered
a flurry of scholarly excitement, much of which focused on the
dispute settlement mechanisms built into the organization's
scheme.2 The advent of the World Trade Organization also
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1 The World Trade Organization came into existence on January 1, 1995.
It was the culmination of over seven years of multilateral trade negotiations
known as the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round constituted the most
ambitious and most complex trade negotiations ever undertaken. See Arthur
Dunkel, 'Trade Policies for a Better Future' and the Uruguay Round, in TRADE
POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE: THE "LEUTWILER" REPORT, THE GATT,
AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 1, 1 (1987) (describing the Uruguay Round as
"the most far-reaching, comprehensive and significant multilateral trade
negotiation ever undertaken"). For an excellent history of the Uruguay Round,
see JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1995).
2 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution:
Building a Private-Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111
(1992); Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing Their
Sovereign Rights? The GA 7TDipute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy,
4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161 (1996); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson,
W'TO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National
Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996); Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World
Trade Organization: A New Legal Orderfor World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 349 (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA,77 the ICJ, &
Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043 (1994); David A.
Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the
United States, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 129 (1995); David W. Leebron,
An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11,
14-16 (1995); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional
Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 1994; Curtis Reitz,
Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tari and Trade, 17 U. PA.J. INT'L
ECON. L. 555 (1996); Michaer K. Young, Book Review, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 160
(1996) (reviewing YUJI IWASAWA, WTO NO FUNSO SHORI [The Dispute
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generated scholarly debate on the nature and future of the World
Trade Organization. One such debate, concerning participation
in the World Trade Organization by nongovernmental parties
("NGOs"), was published in an earlier volume of the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law? This
essay continues that debate.
The issue that initiated this debate was whether standing
before World Trade Organization dispute settlement panels should
be extended to include nongovernment parties. Currently, only
member countries4 of the World Trade Organization may appear
before such panels.5 In a provocative article published in the
Settlement of the World Trade Organization).
h See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 331 (1996); Philip
M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 295 (1996); G. Richard
Shel, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 359 (1996).
' Any "separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct
of its external commercial relations," such as Hong Kong or Gibraltar, may also
become a member of the World Trade Organization. Agreement Establishing
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations [WorldTrade Organization], Apr. 15,1994,
art. XII(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], 33 I.L.M. 13, 21 [hereinafter Charter]. This
essay uses the term country as a term of convenience that is intended to include
all members of the organization.
s The primary organic document of the World Trade Organization is its
charter, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter Final
Act]. Several agreements are annexed to the Charter, including one which sets
forth the procedure for the settlement of disputes among members of the
World Trade Organization. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 4, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding]. The
Dispute Settlement Body, composed of all of the members of the World Trade
Organization who choose to participate, administers the settlement process. See
id. para. 2.1. A member may bring a complaint against another member for
a number of reasons, the most common of which is that an action by that
member nullifies or impairs a benefit that is supposed to accrue to the
complaining member pursuant to one of the trade agreements administered by
the World Trade Organization. See id. para. 3.3. The members must consut
with one another, hut if consultation does not resolve the dispute, the
complaining member may request that a panel hear its complaint. See id. para.
4.3. The panel, consisting of three persons selected by the World Trade
Organization and agreed to by the parties, takes oral and written testimony
from the disputants and from other concerned members of the Organization.
The panel issues a report wherein it determines whether the complaint is
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Duke Law Journal, Professor Richard Shell suggests that standing
should be expanded. His suggestion is part of a larger vision that
he has for the World Trade Organization, which he calls a "Trade
Stakeholders Model."6 Specifically, the Trade Stakeholders Model
"seeks to break the monopoly of states on international dispute
resolution machinery and to extend the power to enforce
international legal norms beyond states to individuals."7 The
Trade Stakeholders Model also embraces "a vision of civic
republican 'participatory legalism."' 8
Although I do not necessarily disagree with the concept that
the World Trade Organization should avail itself of the expertise
of "outside" persons and interest groups, I do have several
concerns with respect to expansion of standing, which I outlined
in the first essay that appeared in the above-referenced debate.9
Steve Charnovitz, who as director of the Global Environment and
Trade Study at Yale University has made several important
contributions to the understanding of the relationship between
trade and societal values,10 followed with an essay that not only
responded to my concerns regarding expansion of standing, but
also advocated participation by interest groups in policymaking by
the World Trade Organization." Professor Shell concluded the
debate with an essay that not only responded to Charnovitz and
myself, but also criticized my proposal that suggested the World
Trade Organization refrain from scrutinizing a country's action
justified. If so, it recommends action to be taken by the World Trade
Organization. See id. paras. 8-16. Parties may appeal a panel report to an
Appellate Body which sits in three-person panels chosen from a standing group
of seven persons. See id. para. 17. The panel report, or the report of the
Appellate Body, becomes final unless every member of the Dispute Settlement
Body votes aganst adoption of the report. See id. para. 17.4. For a more
thorough explication of the process, see Dillon, supra note 2, at 373-92; Philip
M. Nichols, GATE Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1996); Reitz,
supra note 2, at 580-87.
6 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829, 910 (1995).
7 Id. at 915.
8Id.
9 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 303-21.
10 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade:
Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459 (1994); Steve Charnovitz,
The World Trade Organization and Social Issues, J. WoRLD TRADE, Oct. 1994,
at 17.
" See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 340-48.
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if that action reflects fundamental societal values and only
incidentally impedes trade.
12
Professor Shell had the last word in the debate concerning his
proposal for expansion of standing and so it shall remain.13 In
this essay I intend to accomplish two goals. First, I wish to
clarify issues raised by Steve Charnovitz concerning the participa-
tion by nongovernment organizations in the policymaking process
of the World Trade Organization. Second, I will respond to
Professor Shell's criticisms of my suggestion for the World Trade
Organization, and show that the theoretical underpinnings for
international relations are not as limited as set forth in his essay.
2. PARTICIPATION BY INTEREST GROUPS IN POLICYMAKING
BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Steve Charnovitz advocates participation by nongovernmental
organizations, which I shall refer to as interest groups, 14 "in the
work of the World Trade Organization."15 After discussing the
involvement of interest groups in other international organiza-
tions" and his dissatisfaction with the role of interest groups in
both the GATT and the World Trade Organization,'
12 See Shell, supra note 3, at 378-79; Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without
Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658 (1996).
13 I leave that debate with a concession and an observation. Professor Shell
predicts business entities will someday have standing to bring complaints before
the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement panels (which presumably
would then be given a different name. See Shell supra note 6, at 902-03. If this
occurs as Shell predicts, I concede that other interested, nonbusiness parties
should also have access. I observe that Shell's discourse has changed slightly,
from an emphasis on participation by individuals, to one of NGO partici-
pation. Compare Shell, supra note 6, at 915, with Shell, supra note 3, at 376.
14 In the study of international organizations, the term "nongovernmental
organization" includes business entities. As I read Charnovitz, however, he
does not include business entities. Hence my preference for the term "interest
groups."
15 Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 331. Charnovitz ignores an argument for
direct participation by individual citizens because "[n]obody... calls for such
direct participation." Id. at 343. In fact, Professor Shell suggests just such
participation. See Shell, supra note 6, at 915 (stating that the Trade
Stakeholders Model seeks to "extend the power to enforce international legal
norms beyond states to individuals").
16 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 335-37.
17 See id. at 337-40. In the environmental realm, with which Charnovitz
is most concerned, the situation may not be as dire as he depicts. The Policy
Dialogue on Trade and the Environment, which includes representatives of
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Charnovitz discusses the need for interest group participation in
the policymaking functions of the World Trade Organization.
Unfortunately, Charnovitz structures much of his discussion of
policymaking as a response to and criticism of my discussion of
standing before World Trade Organization dispute settlement
panels. As Charnovitz himself points out, however, standing and
participation are distinct phenomena that raise separate issues; one
can be extended to nongovernment parties without the other.18
In fact, I applaud the fact that "the door has been opened" to
nongovernmental parties and suggest that "it is probable that some
fine tuning could occur in these arrangements."19
The fact that the disagreement that Charnovitz posits between
ourselves is a faux disagreement does not mean that Charnovitz
and I agree. In particular, I do not agree that participation in
policymaking can be scrutinized in the context of issues that arise
in a debate over standing. Scrutinizing participation through the
lens of standing produces two dangers: first, progress will appear
to occur as problems that are not really at issue are solved; and
second, pertinent substantial issues will be ignored.2' In this
environmental action groups, governmental and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and the World Trade Organization, recently met in "a spirit of common
purpose and collegiality." Report, Second Meeting, Talloires, France 1 (Apr.
27-29, 1995) (on file with author). In general, the World Trade Organization
has recently adopted guidelines "for improving transparency and frthering
contacts" between the World Trade Organization and interest groups. GeneraI
Council Takes Steps to Further Relations with NGOs, FOCUS (WTO Newsl.),
June-July 1996, at 8.
"s See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 340 ("These general issues are separa-
ble.").
19 Nichols, supra note 3, at 308 n.57.
10 In formal lo~ic, the technique of setting up an argument that does not
exist and then refuting that misrepresented argument is called the "straw man"
fallacy. See DOUGLAS WALTON, A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF FALLACY 57
(1995). The straw man technique is fallacious because it leads to irrelevancies
and because it precludes the development and resolution of the true issues of
contention. See MADSEN PIRIE, THE BOOK OF THE FALLACY 160 (1985) ("The
straw man is fallacious because he says nothing about the real argument.");
WALTON, supra, at 211 (stating that a straw man "could be a strong impedi-
ment to resolving [a] conflict of opinions. ... [I]t would prevent proper
maieutic insight into one's own point of view from developing").
This technique also creates the possibility that an argument will be mis-
characterized. For example, Charnovitz states that "Nichols worries that the
presence of NGOs would undermine 'the apparent authority' of governments,
and thus their ability to negotiate trade policies." Charnovitz, supra note 3, at
342. The passage that he cites actually reads "expansion of standing will
1996]
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section, I will attempt to rectify the latter of these problems by
identifying substantial issues raised by Charnovitz's proposal that
interest groups take a more substantial role in the deliberations of
the World Trade Organization. These issues involve comparing
the World Trade Organization to other international organiza-
tions, examining the extent and quality of interest group participa-
tion, and exploring whether the inclusion of interest groups
enhances or blunts democratic representation.
2.1. If Every Other International Organization Jumps Off of a
Roof Should the World Trade Organization Follow?
Charnovitz makes the intriguing argument that "NGOs are on
solid legal ground in seeking greater transparency and participa-
tion in the WTO" because "[d]rawing on the expertise of NGOs
is a hallmark of other intergovernmental organizations and
institutions."2  The first part of this statement can be dis-
missed;' what is intriguing is the comparative methodology that
undermine the apparent authority." Nichols, supra note 3, at 316 (emphasis
added). Charnovitz also reports concern on my part that allowing NGO
participation in policymaking would favor groups with greater resources. See
Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 343. The passage that Charnovitz cites actually
discusses the fact that creating another layer of adjudication through the
expansion of standing would favor wealthier interest groups, which can fund
additional litigation. See Nichols, supra note 3, at 318-19. Similarly Charnovitz
reports concern on my part that interest group participation in policymaking
could cause the WorldTrade Organization to move away from the pursuit of
liberalized trade. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 343. The passage he cites
discusses only the ramifications of expansion of standing. See Nichols, supra
note 3, at 319-20.
21 Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 334-35.
' The actions of other international organizations do not place interest
groups on "solid legal ground." Interest groups are on "solid egal ground"
because the Charter of the World Trade Organization allows the General
Council of the World Trade Organization to "make appropriate arrangements
for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations."
Charter, supra note 4, art. V(2). The organic documents of any international
organization delimits its functions and authority. See Advisory Opinion No.
3, Agricultural Production and the International Labor Organization, 1922
P.C.IJ. (ser. B) No. 3, at 53-55 ("The answer to the question ... must likewise
depend entirely upon the construction to be given to the same treaty provisions
from which, and from which alone, that Organization derives its existence and
its powers."). The doctrine that an international organization has implied
powers necessary to carry out its specified functions -Aso bestows authority.
See Advisory Opinion Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (April 11) ("Under international law, the
Organization [United Nations] must be deemed to have those powers which,
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the statement implies. Indeed, Charnovitz makes several referenc-
es to other international organizations, including the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, UNESCO, and the
International Labour Organization. 23
Undisciplined comparison of international organizations is
sometimes meaningless because international organizations are
vastly dissimilar.24 A commonly used taxonomy of international
organizations categorizes organizations by their membership.
Sovereign governments alone comprise the membership of
intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs"); government agencies
that are independent of the central government comprise
transgovernmental organizations ("TGOs"); nongovernmental
organizations comprise international nongovernmental organiza-
tions ("INGOs"); both governmental and nongovernmental
members form hybrid INGOs; and what legal scholars generally
refer to as multinational corporations are business international
nongovernmental organizations ("BINGOs").2 Even this simple
taxonomy reveals differences between the mentioned international
organizations: the International Labour Organization is a hybrid
INGO, UNESCO is a TGO, and the OECD and World Trade
Organization are IGOs. The fact that the International Labour
Organization and UNESCO occupy categories different from the
World Trade Organization raises questions about broad compari-
sons between the organizations.
Advocates of interest group participation may counter that the
point of their efforts is to transform the World Trade Organiza-
tion from an IGO to a hybrid INGO, and that any taxonomy
based on membership will always preclude comparison. The
point is valid, but does not mean that international organizations
are identical or that comparison between disparate organizations
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.").
' See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing comparisons).
24 See GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 4-5 (1981) (suggesting that comparison of the GATT
and the European Court of Justice is mi-leading).
2s See CLIvE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 36-43 (1983).
Another common method of classifying international organizations is by their
purpose. See Michel Virally, Definition and Classification of International
Organizations: A Legal Approach, in THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 50, 58-64 (Georges Abi-Saab ed., 1981) (discussing various
purposes an international organization might have).
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is valid.
A far more sophisticated taxonomy explicated by Paul Taylor
does not rely on membership but instead relies on the "theory"
underlying each international organization.26 Taylor divides
explanations of international organizations into three groups: (1)
"adjustment theories," which explain the responses of national
governments to changes in the global environment; (2) "integra-
tion theories," which anticipate a refashioning of the traditional
state-oriented system of international relations; and (3) "constitu-
tional theories," which go beyond the state system and look
toward new methods of ordering the world into a unified
whole.27
Taylor's taxonomy does not end with these broad divisions.
For example, Taylor divides adjustment theories into different
styles of intergovernmental cooperation in international organiza-
tion: (1) coordination; (2) cooperation; (3) harmonization; (4)
association; (5) parallel national action; and (6)
supranationalism.28 Taylor similarly divides integration theories
and constitutional theories.29
Taylor's work is useful for three reasons. First, it shows that
international organizations can be differentiated on an intrinsic
basis rather than by the nature of their memberships. Second, it
illustrates the tremendous variety among international organiza-
tions. Most importantly, it raises serious questions about the
validity of undisciplined comparisons of international organiza-
tions.
The age-old admonition parents give to their children, "if all
26 Paul Taylor, A Conceptual Typology of International Organization, in
FRAMEWORKS FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERAION 12, 12 (A.J.R. Groom &
Paul Taylor eds., 1990). Taylor's classification is not, of course, the only
departure from the more standard taxonomies. Johan Galtung, for example,
has devised a fascinating typology based on the degree of association an
international organization's members have with a discernible territory. Johan
Galtung, Non-Territorial Actors: The Invisible Continent. Towards a Typology of
International Organizations, in THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATION, supra note 25, at 67, 67-75. For reasons discussed above, I find a
taxonomy based on the qualities of international organizations more useful than
a taxonomy based on the nature of the organizations' memberships. See supra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
27 See Taylor, supra note 26, at 12-24.
28 See id. at 12-13.
29 See id. at 17-18, 21-24.
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the other kids in the neighborhood jumped off of a roof, would
you want to jump off too," relies on the legitimate premise that
all of the neighborhood children are similar in at least one respect:
if they jump off of a roof, none of them will fly, but instead each
will fall to the ground. Basing the argument for increased
participation by interest groups in World Trade Organization
policymaking on the fact that certain other international organiza-
tions allow such participation depends on establishing similarities
between the World Trade Organization and those organizations.
Comparative analysis cannot be reduced to a simple "me, too"
argument.
Charnovitz makes several dubious comparisons. For example,
he compares the World Trade Organization to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council and to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.30 These two organiza-
tions, however, are easily distinguished from the World Trade
Organization. Although both sometimes coordinate the negotia-
tion of discrete treaties, neither conduct the type of rule creation
or enforcement the World Trade Organization requires.3'
Likewise, the International Labour Organization, which
Charnovitz suggests as a model for the World Trade Organiza-
tion,32 is also more successful at creating norms than at devising
and enforcing binding regulations.33 Comparison of a complaint
brought by United States Senate restaurant workers in the
30 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 343. Charnovitz does not explicitly state
that the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the Organization
For Economic Cooperation and Development are comparable to the World
Trade Organization. Rather, he implies comparability by suggesting that the
World Trade Organization can easily borrow procedures from the other organi-
zations.
31 See Russian OECD Application Received, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 897
(May 29, 1996) ("[R]ecommendations and resolutions adoptea by OECD
countries on the issue are advisory, rather than binding ...
32 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 335-36, 343.
From the International Labour Organization's creation in 1919 until
1988, the United States adopted only eight conventions promulgated by the
ILO. All were maritime conventions. The 144th convention promulgated by
the ILO marked the first non-maritime convention that the United States
adopted. See Tadd Linsenmayer, U.S. Ends ILO Moratorium by Ratifying Two
Conventions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1988, at 52, 52. In addition to
Conventions, the International Labour Organization issues Recommendations
which are not intended to be binding, but instead are to be "used as general
guidelines for national policy and action." Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States'
Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 51 (1989).
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International Labour Organization with possible suits by domestic
interest groups in the World Trade Organization 4 is nonsensical.
The International Labour Organization does not participate in
delicate and complex trade negotiations.3
5
Finally, Charnovitz's discussion leaves little doubt that
interest group participation has greatly furthered the resolution of
international environmental issues. Unfortunately, perhaps
because he bases his comments on issues that pertain to standing,
his discussion does not provide insight as to whether the environ-
mental regimes are comparable to the trade regime. What is true
of international organizations, however, is true of international
regimes. The structure and nature of international institutions
matter, and in the absence of a rigorous treatment of structure,
comparative analysis is suspect.
2.2. Where to Draw the Line
In my essay on standing, I suggest that the fact that nongov-
ernmental parties do not appear before dispute panels acts as a
buffer between decisionmakers and special interest groups. A
great number of persons usually share the benefits of trade
liberalization, while the parties harmed by liberalized trade,
including those involved in inefficient industries that cannot
survive competition and those who are collecting monopolistic or
oligopolistic rents created by protectionist laws, are fairly
concentrated.3 6 If all parties had standing, narrow protectionist-
oriented interest groups would be more likely to muster the
resources necessary to appear before dispute panels than would the
more numerous beneficiaries of trade liberalization. 7
Charnovitz transposes my arguments concerning standing in
his discussion of participation in policymaking and states, "[t]he
notion that the international trade regime should be a buffer
34 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 354.
35 See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (explaining why trade
negotiations are laborious and complex).
31 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 320; Charles K. Rowley & Robert D.
Tollison, Rent-Seeking and Trade Protection, in PROTECTIONISM AND
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 141, 151-52 (Heinz Hauser ed., 1986).
37 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 36, at 152 (stating that beneficiaries
of trade liberalization lack incentives to gather information, organize, or vote);
Shell, supra note 6, at 878-80 (stating that protected industries mobilize
constituencies to preserve protectionist laws).
[Vol. 17:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss3/3
REALISM AND LIBERALISM
between the makers of trade policy and the public is an elitist
view that should not find refuge in liberal governance."
38
Although extremely well-crafted and emotionally appealing,
Charnovitz's argument is also irrelevant and incorrect. 39  At
some point in a representative government, the chosen representa-
tive will act independently of the persons she represents. "Liberal
governance" is replete with policymaking situations in which the
public does not participate. For example, there are no institution-
al arrangements for interest groups to participate in cabinet
meetings in the executive branch of United States government, or
in Council of Ministers' meetings in the European Union, or in
the United Nations Security Council's meetings. At some point
participatory government ends and representative government
takes over.
Where this transition occurs is critical, especially when it
involves the participation of interest groups. Mancur Olson has
demonstrated that extensive participation by interest groups in
policymaking results in inefficiency, misallocation of resources,
and slow economic growth.4 This phenomenon eventually
occurs even when the interest groups initially represent broad
portions of the population, because achieving the groups' interests
requires such groups to become focused.41 The United States'
experience with interest group participation in commercial
regulation is also instructive. Regulations that interest groups
influence, such as the tax code, tend to be somewhat distorted.42
Regulations relatively uninfluenced by interest groups, such as
those dealing with securities, tend to be much less distorted.43
" Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 345.
39 See WALTON, supra note 20, at 196 (stating "relevance is an important
aspect of ad hominem as a fallacy").
40 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41-47
(1982).
41 See Mancur Olson Jr., The Devolution of the Nordic and Teutonic
Economies, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 22, 25 (1995).
42 See ROBERT H. SALISBURY, INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: SUBSTANCE
AND STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLiTICS 339 (1992) (stating that taxation has
acquired many of its strange contours because of the pressures and demands of
narrowly-based interest groups).
'3 See Alexander C. Dill, Broker-Dealer Regulations Under the Securities Act
of 1934: The Case of Independent Contracting, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 189,
253 (1994). The trade regime's experience with interest groups is also
instructive. Indeed, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade came into
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j. Int'l Econ. L.
Although interest group participation will impose costs on the
World Trade Organization's regulations, this does not mean that
interest groups should never have a role in policymaking. If
interest groups are to be allowed an extensive role in
policymaking, however, then the benefits of such participation
must outweigh the costs that the public will bear.
Against these costs, Charnovitz suggests two benefits of
increased participation by interest groups in World Trade
Organization policymaking. He suggests that interest group
participation will do the following: (1) "prod" governments to
negotiate more quickly and to better results; and (2) increase
public support for trade liberalization. 44 These proposed benefits
merit closer scrutiny.
2.2.1. Faster and Better Results
Charnovitz, to his credit, does not overstate the possibility
that interest groups could produce more diligent negotiations; he
couches his comments in words such as "could" and "might." His
one piece of evidence to substantiate the claim that participation
by interest groups will result in more effective negotiation is that
during the seven years of Uruguay Round negotiations, interest
groups played an active role in the negotiations of seven global
existence partly to avoid distortivepressures by interest groups. "I was told
that Will Clayton said that 'we need-to act before the vested interests get their
vests on.' Whether he really said that, I don't know, but it makes the point."
William Diebold, Reflections on the International Trade Organization, 14 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 335, 336 (1994).
Gharnovitz points out that the charter for the International Trade
Organization, negotiated at the same time as the other Bretton Woods
institutions but never finalized, allowed interest group participation.
Charnovitz suggests that had the International Trade Organization come into
existence, its creators would have allowed interest group participation. See
Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 338-39. The persons who negotiated the
International Trade Organization charter, however, are the same persons who
administered the GATT. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Book Review, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 663, 664 (1995) (reviewing ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM (1993) and noting the club-like atmosphere of the early GATT).
In its early years, the GATT allowed nongovernment parties to participate in
the GATT process. See Nichols, supra note 3, at 305. If, as Charnovitz
suggests, the GATT later terminated the early practice of allowing interest
group participation, one must ask why it did so.
4 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 341, 344-45.
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environmental agreements. 45  The comparison between the
Uruguay Round and the negotiation of these environmental
accords, however, is spurious. Generally, multinational trade
negotiations are not like any other form of international negotia-
tion. Rather, the most-favored-nation principle, which mandates
that any concession granted to one party must be extended to
every other party, makes them more complex.46 The Uruguay
Round in particular was the most complex trade negotiation ever
undertaken. 47  Moreover, unlike almost every other treaty,
countries had to accept the results of the Uruguay Round in their
entirety; countries could not reserve or refuse to abide by certain
portions of the treaty.
4
The proposition that adding more participants to a negotiation
will bring the negotiation to a more rapid conclusion is inherently
41 See id. at 341 (citing Jessica Mathews, The Great Greenless GA 77, WASH.
POST, Apr. 11, 1994, at A19).
46 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 316-17; see also GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 52-56 (1992) (describing
the complexity and difficulty of negotiating international trade agreements).
The most-favored-nation principle makes negotiators reluctant to give
concessions to one party, because they will lose leverage over other parties. See
GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS 62 (1986).
41 See supra note 1; Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 477 ("The agenda for the
Uruguay Round was massive, making it by far the most ambitious trade
negotiation ever.").
48 Most treaties contain a provision allowing a party to state that it will not
be bound by a certain portion of that treaty, a practice that has become
widespread in recent years. See FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRE-
TATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 2-4 (1988) ("[T]he
phenomenon of reservations has developed into a problem of international law
... ."). The ability to carve out portions of a treaty obviously makes the
process of negotiation easier, and acceptance of treaties more likely. See John
King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of
State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 372 (1980) ("Most arguments in favor
of the liberal use of reservations have as their cornerstone the belief that the
liberal admissibility of reservations will encourage wider acceptance of
treaties."). The treaties that create and accompany the World Trade Organiza-
tion, on the other hand, must be accepted as a whole - a party may not carve
out any portion and refuse to abide by that portion. See Fina Act, supra note
5, para. 4 ("[T]he WTO Agreement shall be open for acceptance as a whole.");
Charter, supra note 4, art. XVI(5) ("No reservations may be made in respect of
any provisions of this Agreement."); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing
Our Views Toward Recoupment and Market Power: Attacking the
Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy Through WTO-Consistent Global Welfare
Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 127 (1996) ('[S]ignatories must accept
the Agreement 'as a whole.'").
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suspect. The usual result is the converse, that more participants
tend to lengthen negotiations.49 In the absence of legitimate
empirical information, this purported rationale for incurring the
costs of interest group participation remains at issue.
In addition to suggesting that interest group participation will
lead to quicker results, Charnovitz suggests that it will lead to
better results. To support his assertion that the Uruguay Round
produced flawed results, he relies on an assessment by Jeffrey
Schott and Johanna Buurman which gave the Uruguay Round a
grade of "B+."5° Schott and Buurman published their insightful
" See Tom Farer, New Players in the Old Game: The De Facto Expansion of
Standing to Participate in Global Security Negotiations, 38 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 842,
862-63 (1995) (noting that international organizations and interest groups have
been granted access to international security negotiations, but predicting that
continuous expansion of standing will overwhelm the process and hinder the
creation of effective global solutions). Charnovitz states that "[o]ne reason why
the Uruguay Round took so long to complete was because little occurred
during extended periods of time as governments either stewed at each other or
awaited national elections in individual countries." Charnovitz, supra note 3,
at 341. John Croome's book-length discussion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations reveals that there were times when formal negotiations were not
conducted. CROOME, supra note 1, passim. During these periods there was
much activity by the GATT Secretariat or by informal negotiating groups. See
id. It should also be noted that the one example that Charnovitz provides -
the dispute between the United States and the European Union over agriculture
- occurred at the behest of special interest groups.
50 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 341-42 n.51 (citing JEFFREY J. SCHOTT
& JOHANNA W. BUURMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 8
(1994). As a general indictment of the trade regime Charnovitz cites an
estimate by Mahbub ul Haq that "only seven percent of world production
crossing national borders is subject to the trade liberalization rules of the
GATT." Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 346 (citing Overview, in THE UN AND
THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 3, 5 (Mahbub ul Haq et al. eds., 1995)). Ul Haq provides no
methodology for his estimate. His explanatory comments, however, shed much
light on his estimate: "excluding as it does agricultural commodities, tropical
products, textiles, services, capital flows, labour flows, intellectual property
resources, etc." Overview, supra, at 5. These, of course, are the very subjects
the Uruguay Round covered and the World Trade Organization continues to
negotiate. In fact, in a later essay in the same anthology, ul Haq states that
"[t]he recently concluded Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
may, however, change this situation." Mahbub ul Haq, The Vision and the
Reality, in THE UN AND THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra, at 26, 30. It is true,
as Charnovitz points out, that stubborn pockets of protectionism remain - no
one claims that the work of the trade regime is finished. The usual criticism
of the trade regime is not, however, that it is as protectionist as implied by
Charnovitz. Rather, the usual criticism is that the trade regime emphasizes free
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and widely respected assessment under the auspices of the
International Economic Institute. Their assessment takes as its
standard of perfection a purely economic and commercially-
oriented paradigm for world trade regulation; most of their
criticisms of the Uruguay Round concern concessions to interest
groups.5 ' As a baseline of perfection, Schott and Buurman's
version of an "A +" agreement is probably not an agreement with
which Charnovitz would be comfortable. Moreover, it almost
certainly is not an agreement that could be achieved with
extensive interest group participation.
If interest group participation yields the "best results," it will
not be because the best results are economically efficient. Both
Mancur Olson and common sense indicate that interest group
participation will result in inefficiencies and misallocations.52 If
interest group participation yields better results, it will be because
those results more accurately reflect and satisfy the needs, desires,
and wishes of the majority of persons who live under the regime
created by those results.53 This depends on whether interest
trade over other societal values. See Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures
and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751,751 (1993) ("[N]on-
trade concerns are subordinate to trade concerns within the GATT frame-
work."); Alberto Berhabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream:'
Globalization and Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 205, 224 n.99 (1995) (describing World Trade Organization as a"regime that places trade uber alles"); Robert Iowse & Michael Trebilcock, The
Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour and the Environment, in ECONOM-
IC PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (Alan 0. Sykes & Jagdeep
Bhandari eds., forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 1, 2-3, on file with author ("A
visceral distrust of any or all demands for trade restrictions has im Ed a
careful analysis of the kinds of normative claims at issue. ... "); Nichols, supra
note 12, at 700 ("That the trade regime gives primacy to trade is evidenced
throughout the history of the GATT dispute settlement, as well as in the
writings of officials and scholars closely allied with the General Agreement and
the nascent World Trade Organization."); Shell, supra note 6, at 837 (stating
that various models of trade management "seek to promote trade over other
domestic and transnational values").
51 See Gharnovitz, supra note 3, at 341-42 n.51 (citing SCHOTT &
BUURMAN, supra note 50, at 8). Fortunately, there are less dogmatic
assessments of the Uruguay Round, which generally are favorable. See, e.g.,
John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17, 23 (1996) ("The Uruguay Round itself has been the most
ambitious of the trade rounds under GAT 'T, and would be a success with half
of its achievements.").
5See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
SSatisfaction of needs, desires, and wishes is often but not always
coincident with economic efficiency. See Nichols, supra note 12, at 704. For
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group participation enhances the ability of the World Trade
Organization to perceive and act upon those needs, desires, and
wishes. I address that issue in a later section of this essay.5
4
2.2.2. Increased Public Support
Charnovitz also suggests that interest group participation in
policymaking will broaden public support for the World Trade
Organization."5 If this is true, it would easily justify the costs of
interest group participation. Unfortunately, Charnovitz provides
no evidence for this proposition, and his anecdotal statements deal
entirely with the United States. A brief review of the literature
reveals, however, that interest groups are not universally trusted
outside of the United States. 6
Even with respect to the United States and Western Europe,
where interest groups flourish, 7 I hesitate to accept the assertion
example, economists can construct arguments that promote the sale of human
beings as efficient. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shorta ge, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 339 (1978) (suggesting
elimination of restrictions that prevent the market from operating freely in the
sale of babies as of other goods"). Society does not countenance the sale of
human beings, not because it is efficient or inefficient, but because it is wrong.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THIE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 376-77 (1990)
(stating that slavery is economically defensible but intuitively wrong); see also
STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 29 (1981) (arguing that people make decisions on the basis of
beliefs rather than economics).
"' See infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
15 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 347. Shell makes this point as well. See
Shell, supra note 6, at 922-24.
56 See, e.g., Marx V. Aristide & Laurie Richardson, Democracy
Enhancements' - U.S. Style, NACLA REP. ON THE AM., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 35,
35 (arguing that under the guise of nongovernmental organizations, the United
States channeled millions of dollars into Haiti to destabilize popular movements
and to undermine Jean-Baptiste Aristide); Rebecca Dodd, 'Do-Goodism is
Ruining This Country,' WORLD PRESS REV., Mar. 1995, at 9 (reporting
Rwandan concerns that nongovernment organizations are hindering Rwanda's
post-war recovery). But see John Clark, The State, Popular Participation, and the
Voluntary Sector, 23 WORLD DEV. 593, 593 (1995) (stating that nongovernmen-
tal organizations sometimes best represent the poorest sectors of developing
countries).
" See Lester M. Salamon, The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector, FOREIGN AFF.,
July-Aug. 1994, at 109, 109-22 (documenting the increase in the number of
nonprofit interest groups in the United States and Western Europe and
suggesting that such groups may "permanently alter" the relationship between
states and citizens).
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that interest group participation increases public support without
empirical validation of this hypothesis. An informal survey of
thirty acquaintances and colleagues"8 reaffirmed my doubts
regarding the assumption. Although twenty-three belonged to or
supported financially interest groups or nonprofit nongovernment
organizations, none knew whether their group participated in
policymaking in any international organizations. Similarly, most
did not know whether participation by their chosen organization
would cause them to support the work of an international
59organization.
Although this informal survey lacks the rigor necessary to
prove or disprove Charnovitz's hypothesis, it does suggest that
the assumption that interest group participation in policymaking
will increase public support for the World Trade Organization
may not be as straightforward as Charnovitz implies. Indeed,
without empirical data legitimately applicable to the World Trade
Organization or a coherent theoretical rationale that takes into
account the structure of the World Trade Organization, this issue
too must be considered unresolved.
The participation of "special" interest groups also raises serious
questions with respect to public support. In the United States, the
participation of "special" interest groups generates disdain instead
of support.'" "Special interest group," however, is merely a term
" One in Moscow, one in Frankfurt, four in Canada, and the remainder
in the United States.
s1 Four responded affirmatively, one said no, two refused to participate, and
the remaining twenty-three felt they did not have sufficient information to
answer the question.
60 A Gordon S. Black poll taken May 1992 found:
74% of registered likely voters agreed that 'Congress is largely owned
by the special interest groups,' 83% agreed that '[t]he special interest
groups that give campaign contributions to candidates have more
influence over the government than the voters,' and 85% agreed that
'[s]pecial interest money buys the loyalty of candidates.'
Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1129 (1994);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 29 (1985) (-[T]he American scheme of governance ... is challenged
on the grounds that it allows powerful private organizations to block necessary
government action . .. the lawmaking process has been transformed into a
series of accommodations among competing elites . . . .") (citations omitted).
Of course, the United States Congress and the World Trade Organization are
not comparable institutions: members of the World Trade Organization are
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of art and does not designate an identifiable subset of interest
groups. Any attempt to preclude participation by interest groups
on the grounds that the groups are "special interest groups" would
raise troubling questions of fairness and normative bias.
2.3. The Democracy of Interest Groups
The possibility of increased participation by interest groups in
World Trade Organization policymaking raises the question of
whether interest groups enhance the democratic process. This
question can be broken down into two issues: whether the
creation of trade policy fails to reflect the goals of the majority of
persons who live under that policy, and whether interest groups
are democratic institutions.
2.3.1. Failure of International Trade Policy
Although I first suggested the question of a failure of demo-
catic institutions in the context of government representation in
a dispute,6' Charnovitz transposes the question to his discussion
of participation by interest groups in policymaking.62 He then
answers the question, stating that "many national governments fail
to represent the interests of even a majority of their constituencies
as periodically reflected by low approval ratings." 63  With that
statement, he brushes aside the theoretical and empirical work of
persons such as Robert Dahl, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Roland
Pennock."' More importantly, he fails to respond to Daniel
Verdier's exhaustive study on the relationship between democracy
and international trade policy, in which Verdier concludes:
Voters control policymaking because elections provide
policymakers with incentives to reproduce within their
institutional microcosms the parametric structure of the
not elected officials and thus do not require campaign funding. Nonetheless,
the data indicates a deep mistrust of special interest groups.
6 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 310 ("Professor Shell's suggestion of
expanding standing beyond member nations implicitly assumes that national
governments do not adequately represent the interests of all of their constituen-
cies."). I point out that this assumption is not valid. See id. at 312.
62 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 342.
63 Id.
" See Nichols, supra note 3, at 311-12, n.78.
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electorate. Voters signal to their elected representatives the
balance between particular and general goals that they wish
to see struck by the legislative process. Voter control is
indirect, since voters do not choose the outcome; rather,
they create the incentive structure that motivates politi-
cians to legislate in accordance with voter concerns. In
short, if electors do not necessarily choose policies, they do
choose the decision rules by which lawmakers make
policies.6"
Indeed, there were numerous avenues by which citizens and other
entities provided input, through their governments, to the
Uruguay Round.66
Charnovitz suggests - without explaining why it is critical
that these groups have a voice - that international interest
groups do not have national governments to represent them in the
World Trade Organization.67 The list of organizations that he
provides, however, indicates that the opposite may be true. The
World Wildlife Federation has its base and a powerful lobby in
Washington D.C.6' The International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions is an active member of the International Labour
Organization, 69 which may work with the World Trade Organi-
zation on labor issues.'0 And the International Chamber of
Commerce not only works directly with the World Trade
Organization, but also works with a number of national govern-
65 DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BRITAIN,
FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES 1860-1990, at 290 (1994); see also Nichols,
supra note 3, at 312 n.79 (citing and discussing Verdier).
66 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 305-07 & nn.48-55.
67 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 343.
61 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmen-
tal Law Paradigm and its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 822 n.58
(1986).
69 See Schlossberg, supra note 33, at 77-78; Berta Esperanza Hernandez
Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 15, 57 (1994).
70 See The European Commission: This Week In Europe, M2 Presswire, July
26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("WTO activity in
this field could support the work of the International Labour Organisation, the
[European] Commission argues....").
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ments.71
In short, it cannot be argued that there is a broad failure by
governments to represent the interests of constituencies and of
interest groups.72 A better argument for interest group participa-
tion, then, must be found in the possibility that such participation
will enhance representation of persons in the World Trade
Organization.
2.3.2. Enhancement of Representation through Interest
Groups
At best, interest groups act as the analogue of a class in
litigation: they allow a large number of persons with a propor-
tionally smaller interest in a matter to deal on an equal basis with
a small number of entities whose concentrated interest is propor-
tionally greater. Charnovitz and others have shown that interest
groups have carried out this function quite well in the area of
environmental regulations. 3 Given, however, that trade negotia-
tions are not entirely comparable to environmental negotiations,
and that they are vulnerable to misuse by interest groups to
different degrees, one cannot assume that interest groups will be
as efficacious in trade policymaking.
In the first place, interest groups are not necessarily democratic
or independent. In general, interest groups are not accountable in
a formal sense to the constituencies they purport to represent, and
often the leadership of these groups is not selected by that
constituency.7 4 In some countries interest groups simply cannot
71 See Jon Marks, Trade's Global Police Force, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 1996,
Exporter at 16 (describing the International Chamber of Commerce.
7. Ironically, Charnovitz provides examples of domestic representation of
constituent interests in the United States. While attempting to demonstrate
that the founders of the liberal trade regime favored public participation,
Charnovitz provides three pieces of evidence, each from the United States,
extolling the virtue of public participation in domestic policymaking on
international trade issues. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 345-46 & nn.70-71.
Presumably, once an agenda was agreed upon at the domestic level, a
government representative would advocate that agenda in the international
arena.
'7 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 335-37; A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of
Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of International Environ-
mental Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (1992).
74 Cf Paul Hirst, Quangos and Democratic Government, 48 PARLIAMENTA-
RY AFF. 341, 34142 (1991) (reporting serious concerns created by the fact that
quasi-independent nongovernmental organizations in Britain are not elected and
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be democratic or independent; their very survival depends on
succumbing to pressure from the government. 7
Moreover, the quality and legitimacy of an interest group is
not bona fide simply because the group is not associated with a
government. Any entity that has money can create an interest
group.76 While this may not be a problem in the context of
environmental policymaking,7' it has become a problem in
general.7  Any effort, however, by the World Trade Organiza-
tion to screen out illegitimate or manufactured interest groups will
engender troubling questions of subjectivity and normative bias.79
Finally, Charnovitz neither raises nor resolves the fundamental
paradox of interest group participation in the process of gover-
nance: "interest groups solve collective action problems, but they
bring destructive factionalism ... in their wake." 0  Again, the
differences in regimes compound the problem. Arguably, interest
groups involved in international environmental regulation
represent the interests of the majority, and provide a necessary
counterweight to narrowly-defined groups that would exploit the
therefore not accountable). It must be repeated that interest group represen-
tation does not constitute participatory government in the Burkean sense; it is
representative government with a selected, rather than elected, representative.
" See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law:
Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnation-
al Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 494 1994) (stating that the nongov-
ernment organization movement in Indonesia cannot (or not yet) be taken as
the opening of a democratic space, given the extent to which the movement
must abjure politics and allow itself to be co-opted so as not to be destroyed").
71 See SUSAN B. TRENTO, THE POWER HOUSE: ROBERT KEITH GRAY AND
THE SELLING OF ACCESS AND INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON 86-87, 196-97,200
(1992) (providing examples of the instant creation of interest groups).
77 Actually, there is some evidence that it is a problem. See Lynette Lamb,
Deceptive Associations, UTNE READER, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 18 (reporting on false
public interest groups, including groups that posture as pro-environment but
are actually fiinded by commercial interests opposed to environmental
regulations).
78 See Public Interest Pretenders, 59 CONSUMER REP. 316, 316-18 (1994)
(documenting advocacy groups that are fronts for, funded by, or controlled by
corporations or trade associations).
" The fact that the United Nations or other international organizations
that interact with interest groups may not have encountered this problem is
irrelevant. The World Trade Organization will present businesses and
protectionist groups with a much different set of incentives than the United
Nations.
" Lillian R. Bevier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments,
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1273 (1994).
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commons for their own benefit." Conversely, in the context of
international commercial regulation, it can be argued that interest
groups are unlikely to represent the general interest and are more
likely to represent narrowly defined groups.8 2 If the latter
premise is true - and Charnovitz presents no argument that it is
not - then participation by interest groups could increase
factionalism and decrease the degree to which the resulting
regulations represent the majority of persons governed by those
regulations.
2.4. Participation by Interest Groups in Policymaking by the
World Trade Organization
In the end, Charnovitz and I do not disagree that the World
Trade Organization should benefit from the input of entities other
than its own members. I am troubled, however, by the lack of a
rational basis for participation by interest groups. Unfortunately,
an argument that is structured on issues that arise in the context
of standing provides only shallow justification. This essay should
not be interpreted as an argument that the World Trade Organiza-
tion could never benefit from interest group participation.
Indeed, I believe that it could. Instead this essay presents three
issues that are fundamental to a discussion of interest group
participation in policymaking within the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Those issues are: (1) the comparability of the World Trade
Organization to international organizations and regimes that have
successfully integrated interest groups into policymaking; (2) the
extent of participation that can be sustained by the World Trade
Organization; and (3) whether interest group participation
enhances or inhibits representation of the majority's opinions and
desires. Resolution of these three issues would contribute
significantly to the creation of a rigorous argument in favor of
interest group participation in policymaking.
"1 African citizens might question this premise. See JONATHAN S. ADAMS
& THOMAS 0. MCSHANE, THE MYTH OF WILD AFRICA: CONSERVATION
WITHOUT ILLUSION xii-xviii (1992) (discussing differences between the views
of western environmental groups an citizens of Africa).
2 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 36, at 152 (stating that beneficiaries
of trade liberal factions lack incentives to organize); Shell, supra note 6, at 878-
79 (stating that uncompetitive producers "mobilize labor and other constituen-
cies to protect them from foreign competition").
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3. PROFESSOR SHELL'S CRITICISM OF A PROPOSED
EXCEPTION To WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SCRUTINY
In his concluding contribution to our debate, Professor Shell
reconsiders his earlier, tepid approval of my proposal for the
creation of a doctrine that would exempt certain government
practices from scrutiny by the World Trade Organization. Shell's
criticism of my proposal hinges on two arguments: first, that it
rests on an invalid theoretical underpinning; and second, that it
represents a retreat from legalism and thus could damage the
liberal trading system. In this section, I argue that by characteriz-
ing institutionalism as an iteration of realism Shell paints too stark
a picture of the theoretical landscape of international law. I also
show that the proposed exception affirms, rather than retreats
from, the concept that dispute settlement within the World Trade
Organization is more legalistic than it was under the GATT.
Finally, I reiterate safeguards that I originally proposed to protect
the liberal trade system.
To summarize my proposal, the trade agreements annexed to
the Charter of the World Trade Organization act as templates
against which the laws and actions of countries can be evaluated.
When a country's action violates a trade agreement, or when the
action nullifies or impairs a benefit promised under a trade
agreement, the suffering country may ask the World Trade
Organization to review the offending country's action and provide
assistance in obtaining relief. Decisions made by panels convened
under the GATT very much favored trade over other values.
Dispute settlement under the GATT, however, was flexible and
allowed for negotiation of panel decisions. Continuation of a one-
sided approach by the World Trade Organization, which possesses
a more rigid dispute settlement system, endangers the viability of
the liberal trading system. I suggest that the World Trade
Organization should interpret its organic documents to exempt
from scrutiny actions by members that reflect underlying societal
values and only incidentally impede trade.83
3.1. Theoretical Constructs and Contrasts
Shell presents a dichotomy between two competing schools of
3 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 300-02.
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international relations theory: realism and liberalism. According
to Shell, realism "views states as the primary actors in world
affairs and treats all states as autonomous, self-interested, and
animated by the single-minded pursuit of power."8 4  Under
liberalism, on the other hand, "nations are neither conceived of as
autonomous, self-maximizing actors, nor are they considered the
ultimate actors on the international stage."" "Rather, private
individuals, businesses, and interest groups" comprise the essential
actors.86
Although Shell does not do so, this characterization could just
as easily apply to the traditional dichotomy that once paralyzed
international law theory. The realist view posits that states are
the only actors in international law. Idealists, on the other hand,
believe that international law transcends states and will ultimately
lead to a legalistic world government. 7 The stalemate between
these two competing theories contributed to the intellectual
impoverishment of international law in the years following the
Second World War.88  Moreover, neither theory accurately
describes the way that countries and other entities actually
behave.8 9
4 Shell, supra note 3, at 364 (citation omitted).
85 Id. at 367 (citing Shell, supra note 6, at 847 & n.85).
86 Id. at 367 (citing Linda C. Reif, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the
Improvement of International Environmental Law and Institutions, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 723, 737 (1994) (book review)).
87 See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW xii-xvii
(989).
8 Cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 464-76 (1989) (describing
competing theories in international law).
89 Sixteen years ago, David Kennedy set out the theoretical contradictions
inherent to both schools of thought. See David Kennedy, Theses About
International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 353 (1980). A state
cannot be internally absolute, as realist doctrine maintains, and at the same
time be externally social. See id. at 361. On the other hand, an issue is not
"international" until the interests of states collide. See id. at 362. Yet, idealists
assign states a secondary or nonexistent role. Empirical indictment of the
realist doctrine is abundant; in this debate the International Labour Organiza-
tion has been used several times for that very purpose. See, e.g., Shell, supra
note 3, at 372; see also Kennedy, supra, at 362-64 (setting out manifestations of
realist contradiction). Empirical assessment of idealism is not as easy, because
the means by which private actors supposedly manipulate the government are
secretive. An excellent study by Alessandro Bonanno, Douglas Constance, and
Mary Hendrickson, however, uses the mass of evidence generated by the
corruption investigations in Italy as a means of examining the relationship
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Fortunately, international law theory is no longer limited to
these two choices. David Kennedy and Chris Tennant identify "a
dramatic increase during the past two decades in the volume of
scholarly work that aims to rethink the foundations of interna-
tional law and to respond to recent trends in political, social and
legal theory."9° They have compiled a thirty-page bibliography
of papers that depart from traditional theories of international
law, which they refer to as "New Stream" theories.91 These
theories do not constitute a single, cohesive argument; rather, they
take a variety of approaches and import concepts from a variety
of disciplines. 2
Similar to international law theory, international relations
theory is no longer limited to the choice between cynical realism
or idealistic utopianism. One alternative is institutionalism, the
study of regimes. "Regimes are principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations
converge."93 Institutionalists are particularly interested in the
between a very large transnational corporation ("TNC") and a government.
Alessandro Bonanno et al., Global Agro-Food Corporations and the State: The
Ferruzzi Case, 60 RuRAL Soc. 274 (1995). A specific purpose of their study was
to determine whether the state continues to have relevance in the modern
global political and economic system. See id. at 274; see also id. at 275-79 (dis-
cussing various theories regarding relevancy of states). After reviewing the
empirical data, they conclude that"[i]n the interaction between TNCs and the
state, clearly TNCs control and limit the action of the state. However, this
control is only partial as the state retains powers which it uses to oppose
TNCs." Id. at 289. In other words, idealism does not fully explain reality.
' David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law:
A Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 417, 418 (1994).
91 Id. at 431-60.
92 Some of these writers arepublic international law scholars, while others
focus on specific issues, such as the environment, nationalism, or trade. Others
come from legal sociology, comparative law, or legal philosophy. Still others
use insights from anthropology, economics, and feminism. ee id. at 418-19.
Kennedy's own scholarship on international law utilizes the techniques of
critical legal studies. See Carl Landauer, Book Review, 30 HARV. INT'L L.
287 (1989) (reviewing DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES
(1987)).
9' STEPHEN D. KRASNER, STRucTURAL CONFLIcT: THE THIRD WORLD
AGAINST GLOBAL LIBERALISM 4 (1985). The connections between institutional-
ism and international law are abundant. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 335, 406-41 (1989). Institutionalism is now at the forefront of
international law theory. See W. Michael Reisman, Book Review, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 205, 206 (1991) (describing regime theories as "the current rage in the
United States").
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formation of regimes, factors that lead to the persistence or demise
of regimes, categorization of regimes, and the consequences of
regimes.94
Professor Shell, of course, is fully versed in the theory of
international law. In the current debate, however, he describes
institutionalism as "an iteration of realism."95 While institution-
alism does have roots in realist theory,96 Shell's earlier character-
ization of institutionalism as a departure from realism is more
accurate.9" Indeed, one reason for the development of institu-
tionalism was that realists could not explain the continued vitality
of international organizations after the end of the cold war and
the demise of U.S. hegemony.98 Institutionalists provided the
answer: regimes matter because they shape actors' behavior in
ways that are inconsistent with an analysis of actors' relative
powers.
99
Many institutionalist scholars have remained true to the realist
roots of institutionalism and treat states as the primary actors in
international relations or law. °° This is not, however, the
definition of institutionalist theory. Recent work in institutional-
ism includes a variety of actors other than states in international
relations.0 1 Alec Stone proposes a continuum of regimes and
9' See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 454, 454-55
(1995) (discussing the thrust of REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed. 1993)).
9- Shell, supra note 3, at 366 (footnote omitted); see also Shell, supra note 6,
at 858 ("Like realism, regime theory treats states as autonomous actors in the
international arena and focuses on state behavior as the key variable in
analyzing international relations.") Shell uses the older label "regime theory"
for institutionalism.
96 See Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, 36
INT'L ORG. 479, 491-93 (1982) (explicating and criticizing realist roots of
institutionalism).
9' See Shell, supra note 6, at 860; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 205, 218-19 (1993) (characterizing institutionalism as a "challenge"
to realism).
9' See Burley, supra note 97, at 218-19. The realist explanation for
international organizations was that they were maintained at the behest of a
hegemon. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POUTICAL ECONOMY 8-10 (1984).
99 See Slaughter, supra note 94, at 454.
100 See Burley, supra note 97, at 218.
1o' See SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS 199-200 (1988); see also
Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between Public and Private: Internation-
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actors, including actors other than nations."02 Indeed, although
he does not make this claim, Paul Taylor's taxonomy of
international organizations represents an excellent example of such
work. It focuses solely on the nature of the institution and the
underlying theory of an organization, and presents a spectrum of
organizations, from those composed solely of nations to those in
which nationhood is irrelevant. 0 3
Shell's characterization of liberalism denies nations a primary
role in international relations and law1°4 I agree wholeheartedly
with Shell that realism does not fully describe the world as it is.
If, as Shell suggests, I were to locate "all 'societal values' squarely
within nation-states and nowhere else,"105 then I would blind
myself to the myriad international, transnational, and local
societal values." 6 Further, if, as Shell suggests, I found interna-
tional organizations in which nations share power with nongov-
ernmental entities "inconceivable," 7 then I would blind myself
to many of the more interesting international organizations that
have come into existence in this century.0 8 Realism shuts one
eye to the world as it actually exists.
Shell's liberalism, however, is equally blind; it simply closes
the other eye. By excluding nations as significant international
actors, liberalism suffers exactly the same deficiencies as realism.
It refuses to see a portion of the world as it actually exists.0 '
al Regimes and Non-State Actors, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 94, at 94.
'02 See Alec Stone, What is a Supranational Constitution?: An Essay in
International Relations Theory, 56 REV. POL. 441, 470-74 (1994).
101 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
104 Shell, supra note 3, at 367; see also id. at 370 ("[T]he Trade Stakeholders
Model sees individuals and groups - not states - as the primary actors in
international relations.").
105 Shell, supra note 3, at 371.
106 Of course, I do not. See Nichols, supra note 3, at 299 ("Just as is true
of multinational legal regimes (and just as is true of local legal regimes), national
legal regimes often reflect underlying societal values.").
107 Shell, supra note 3, at 371-72.
"I Again, I do not. See Nichols, supra note 3, at 300 (discussing the
International Labour Organization and INTELSAT, and distinguishing them
from the World Trade Organization).
109 An excellent student note in the Harvard Law Review chides realists and
idealists for the exclusive nature of their theories and suggests that both explain,
at various times, the reality of international law. See Note, Developing
Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the Promise of Develop-
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Shell's theoretical perspective may be closer to mine than his
writing suggests. Although he states on several occasions that his
model "sees individuals and groups - not states - as the primary
actors in international relations,""1 he speaks elsewhere of
business interests joining government in the international
arena."' He also states that his model "seeks to break the
monopoly of states on international dispute resolution machin-
ery1"2 which could be interpreted as leaving a role for govern-
ments. Creating such a role for the state would represent an
intriguing departure from traditional liberalism, in which "the
state is conceived of as the agent for particular domestic
constituencies' interests, not as a self-motivated actor seeking
power or political stability.""' This departure holds exciting
possibilities, and could herald the incorporation of institutionalist
elements into liberalism.
Nonetheless, Shell correctly observes that the "differences
between [our] views can better be summarized as a difference in
theoretical approach." 114 Under his approach, the World Trade
Organization cannot be an organization of nations and ideally will
evolve into a "World Union" similar to the European Union.11 5
On the other hand, I am willing to accept that the World Trade
Organization is an organization of nations and place it near one
end of Taylor's taxonomy. While I also accept that there are a
multitude of other forms of international organizations, I am not
forced to believe that change from one form to another is
inevitable, or even always desirable. I have the luxury of critically
evaluating the proposed changes, and measuring them against the
internal coherence of the organization and the realization of
potential benefits.
ment, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1715, 1730 (1995).
110 Shell, supra note 3, at 370 (emphasis added); see id. at 367 ("Under
liberalism, nations are neither conceived of as autonomous, self-maximizing
actors, nor are they considered the ultimate actors on the international stage.");
Shell, supra note 6, at 877 (describing "reduction in the status of the state"
under liberalism).
"I See Shell, supra note 6, at 885.
112 Id. at 915.
1 Id. at 877.
114 Shell, supra note 3, at 371.
1 See id. at 373 (suggesting "the EU as a possible source of inspiration for
what the WTO can become" (emphasis in original)). Shell does not use the
term "World Union."
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3.2. Legalism and Dispute Settlement
Professor Shell suggests that my proposal would "turn the
clock backward instead of forward on trade governance. " 116 By
this, I presume that he means that my proposal is a retreat from
the movement toward legalism that he carefully describes." 7 I
disagree; it is only because the dispute system has become more
legalistic that an exception, such as the one I propose, is required.
The dispute settlement system under the GATT was almost
identical to that set forth in the World Trade Organization's
Understanding on Dispute Settlement,"8 with one critical
difference. Under both systems, panel reports are meaningless
until adopted by the parties to the GATT or the members of the
World Trade Organization. Under the GATT, adoption required
the consensus of all voting parties, which meant that a losing
party could block with its single vote the adoption of a panel
report. The possibility that a losing party could block the
adoption of a panel report created a certain degree of flexibility in
the system and lent it an almost diplomatic nature." 9
Under the World Trade Organization's system, the process is
the reverse. Panel reports are automatically adopted unless all
voting members vote against adoption. This has led most
observers, including Professor Shell, to characterize the process as
more legalistic than that which occurred under the GATT.
As I have noted, with legalism comes rigidity. Members20
can no longer negotiate once a panel has indicated that their
actions violate a trade agreement or nullify or impair the benefits
of another member. Their choice is more stark: comply with or
defy the regulation.
If not overdone, this legalistic rigidity is beneficial.' 2' No
legal system can survive, however, if it becomes overly rigid.
116 Id. at 362.
117 See Shell, supra note 6, at 894.
.. See Understanding, supra note 5.
19 See Nichols, supra note 5, at 100.
10 Setting aside for one moment the differences in theoretical underpin-
nings, this would be true regardless of whether members are countries,
individuals, interest groups, or other nongovernment entities.
121 For example, businesses and policymakers can make better predictions
about how the World Trade Organization will act, and thus can make more
effective decisions concerning their future actions.
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Courts in the United States create exceptions to statutes and
constitutions on a regular basis; there is a body of court-created
exceptions and interpretations to virtually every constitutional
amendment.12 Indeed, two hundred years of constitutional
governance may not have been possible without this judicially
created flexibility1 23 In short, I suggest that the World Trade
Organization adopt this exception not as a retreat from legalism,
but rather as an enhancement and acknowledgment of its more
legalistic dispute resolution system. 24
3.3. Use of the Exception to Circumvent Trade Liberalization
Professor Shell's remaining criticism of the proposed excep-
tion is that it "would encourage domestic protectionist groups to
meticulously draft domestic laws favoring domestic industries to
give these laws an appearance of being 'primarily' directed at a
legitimate 'underlying societal value.' '1 5 This argument often
arises against proposals to balance nontrade issues against trade
issues: proposals to deal with the environment, labor, and even
corruption have been attacked as actual or possible guises for
protectionist activity. 1
6
Because Professor Shell fails to explain why he finds the
safeguard I suggest to be neither "persuasive [nor] principled,"12"
I can only briefly repeat it. Placing a real burden of proof on the
party claiming the exception would preclude parties from claiming
2 See Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue
Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 867, 868 (1994).
12 See generally Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1943) (discussing the need for law to flex to accommodate societal
interests).
124 Once again, the differences in theoretical perspective between Professor
Shell and myself must be emphasized. Professor Shel would cure the perceived
ills of the World Trade Organization by admitting into the process the "real"
actors in international relations, who would then achieve the desired results.
I, on the other hand, suggest that the regime itself be changed in order to both
survive and to yield the optimal results.
125 Shell, supra note 3, at 379. Shell deserves credit for avoiding the trap of
arguing that countries would enact protectionist legislation; he remains true to
the mettle of liberalism.
126 See, e.g., Frances Williams, Labour Rights Plea to WTO, FIN. TIMES, June
12, 1996, at 7 ("Many developing countries, especially in Asia, fear discussion
of labour standards in the WTO would serve as a pretext for the use of trade
sanctions aimed at removing their cheap-labour advantage.").
127 Shell, supra note 3, at 379.
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societal values where none existed."' Shell also contends that
an international tribunal is incapable of discerning societal
values. 129 To the contrary, discerning values is commonplace in
international tribunals, including those that were convened under
the GATT.130
4. CONCLUSION
The World Trade Organization will engender debate for many
years. Although the debate between Richard Shell, Steve
Charnovitz, and myself could be characterized as one concerning
standing and participation, an equally valid and critical point of
contention is whether the membership or the form of the
organization has more bearing on its functioning. Shell and
Charnovitz present excellent and convincing cases for membership
as an important aspect of the World Trade Organization. In
doing so, however, I fear that they slight the importance of form
and the nature of the international trade regime.
Steve Charnovitz bases his justifications for interest group
participation in policymaking on an argument concerning
standing. Unfortunately, that argument structure leads his
justifications away from the form of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, and thus away from fundamental issues. Similarly, by
adopting a liberal perspective that emphasizes actors over form,
Professor Shell blinds his analysis to the possibility that organiza-
tions of nations may be viable, and thus he too unnecessarily
restricts the scope of his analysis. In this essay, I supply a
12 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 301-02. In other words, the party that
brought the complaint would not be required to prove or disprove the
existence of societa values; instead, the burden rests with the party defending
its actions to prove the existence of a societal value and that its actions reflected
that value. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1989) (suggesting that inquiry into intent in the
United States works "by allocating bur ens of proof between the individual and
the state"). International tribunals have much experience at discerning values.
See infra note 130. It would be very difficult for a protectionist government
to fabricate societal values out of whole cloth.
129 See Shell, supra note 3, at 379.
i3i See Nichols, supra note 3, at 301 n.35 (citing Norway, Restrictions on
Imports of Apples and Pears, June 22, 1989, GATT BISD 36th Supp. 306, 321
(1990)). In determining whether custom is a binding source of international
law, tribunals must determine whether a customary behavior is considered
obligatory. The sources used in the determination are similar, if not identical,
to those used to determine societal values. See Nichols, supra note 12, at 717.
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perspective that is missing from both Charnovitz's and Shell's
arguments. Simply put, I provide an institutional counterweight
to their membership arguments.
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